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A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. Court of
International Trade
Kevin C. Kennedy*
In 1980 Congress enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980,1 a
law designed "to improve the Federal judicial machinery by clarify-
ing and revising certain provisions of title 28, United States Code,
relating to the judiciary and judicial review of international trade
matters .... "12 Among the revisions enacted was the enlargement
of the jurisdiction of the United States Customs Court, renamed the
United States Court of International Trade.3 Congress provided for
exclusive jurisdiction within the Court of International Trade
("CIT" or "Court") over most actions involving import transactions
into the United States.4 Born out of a legislative concern that liti-
gants were being frustrated in their attempts to obtain judicial re-
view, the Customs Courts Act of 1980 sought to remedy this prob-
lem "by revising the statutes to clarify the present status,
jurisdiction and powers of the Customs Court."'
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. A.B. 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan; J.D. 1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard
Law School. The author is a former law clerk at the Court of International Trade, and a
former trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for international trade
litigation before the Court of International Trade.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of Title 28,
U.S.C.).
2. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3729 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 12351.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 251
(1982)).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727, 1728-30 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
99 1581-1582 (1982)). See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 20.
5. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 20. As noted in the House report on the
Customs Courts Act of 1980:
Many suits involving international trade issues are and have been instituted
in the federal district courts rather than the U.S. Customs Court. One reason is
that often it is difficult to determine in advance whether or not a particular case
falls within the jurisdictional scheme of the Customs Court, that is, an action
primarily challenging classification and valuation determinations. In addition,
because of the limited powers of the Customs Court, litigants often choose an-
other forum, for example, the federal district courts, where they can gain the
appropriate relief for their alleged injuries. Most district courts have refused to
entertain such suits, citing the Constitutional mandate requiring uniformity of
decisions relating to imports. (See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.) In so doing, the
district courts sought to preserve the Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the U.nited States Customs Courts for judicial review of all matters relat-
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Now that five years have passed since enactment of the Cus-
toms Courts Act, it merits a preliminary inquiry whether that Act
has achieved its purposes and whether there is any continuing justifi-
cation for the CIT as a forum for dispute resolution. This article
explores these questions and concludes that the administration of
justice would be better served if the Court were abolished. This arti-
cle proposes substituting either a system of administrative adjudica-
tion with direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit or, in certain instances, transferring jurisdiction to the federal
district courts. Before discussing this issue, the history of the CIT
will be briefly reviewed.
I. The Genesis of the CIT
The predecessor court to the Court of International Trade, the
Customs Court, had its genesis in 1890 as the Board of General Ap-
praisers." This Board was an administrative body within the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. It had responsibility for reviewing the deci-
sions of officials of the Bureau of Customs in areas such as duty
rates and valuation of merchandise.7 As the types of decisions per-
taining to import transactions expanded to include antidumping
duty8 and subsidy9 determinations, Congress in 1926 created the
United States Customs Court as an article I court to replace the
Board.1" In 1956 the Customs Court was elevated to article III
ing to imports.
The result has been inconsistent judicial decisions with litigants proceeding
cautiously when choosing a forum for judicial review. If an improper forum is
chosen, that may well result in a holding that the plaintiff is before the wrong
court. A dismissal for want of jurisdiction can effectively preclude a judicial
determination of the case on its merits. Furthermore, the type of relief available
depends greatly upon a plaintiff's ability to persuade a court that it possesses
jurisdiction over a particular case. Thus, some individuals will obtain relief
which is denied others, who by chance select an improper forum to institute suit.
With the growth in international trade, the number of suits in the district
courts and subsequent dismissals for want of jurisdiction have increased. Con-
gress is greatly concerned that numerous individuals and firms, who believe they
possess real grievances, are expending significant amounts of time and money in
a futile effort to obtain judicial review of the merits of their case.
H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 19.
6. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 407, §§ 12-13, 26 Stat. 136-37. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235,
supra note 2, at 18; J. LOMBARDI, THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT - A HISTORY OF ITS
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION (1976).
7. Id. The Board of General Appraisers was an administrative tribunal composed of
nine individuals. Its jurisdiction consisted of all controversies arising out of the tariff laws
governing imports. See Rodino, The Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L REV. 459
(1981).
8. See Antidumping Act, 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160
(1976)), repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat.
143, 193.
9. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 935, repealed by Tariff Act of 1930, ch.
497, § 651(a)(1), 46 Stat. 590, 762.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 18. See gener-
ally Rao, A Primer on Customs Court Practices, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 581 (1974).
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status."
With the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,12
Congress recognized that the Customs Court's caseload would be
gradually shifting from tariff classification and valuation issues to
antidumping and countervailing duty cases." Multilateral trade ne-
gotiations being conducted under the auspices of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade" -particularly the Kennedy and Tokyo
Rounds of negotiations concluded in 196715 and 1979,16 respectively
- had led to a significant decrease in tariff duties and, consequently,
"a diminishing importance in classification and valuation cases in the
overall spectrum of international trade litigation."' 7 In light of the
projected surge in antidumping and countervailing duty litigation,
Congress in 1980 believed it was again time to revamp the jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court.' 8
Against this backdrop, we turn to an examination of the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980 as it relates to the CIT.
II. The Customs Courts Act of 1980 - An Overview
As noted, the Customs Courts Act of 1980 ("the Act") not only
made the cosmetic change of renaming the Customs Court the Court
of International Trade,' 9 but, more importantly, the Act set out to
accomplish two major objectives vis-.-vis the CIT: (1) to enlarge and
clarify the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, 20 and (2) to expand
the Court's powers by making them equal to the powers of the fed-
eral district courts.'
The one area in greatest need of clarification regarding subject
matter jurisdiction was in the penumbral region where district court
II. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1976). As of 1956 the Customs Court held all of the powers of an
Article III court except the power to rule in equity. Equitable powers were granted to the
Court in 1980. 28 U.S.C. § 1584. See also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 19.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948).
15. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 223-29 (1969).
16. J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 473
(1977); Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 143, 147-48 (1979).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 19.
18. Id.; S. Rep. No. 466, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.
No. 466]. With the increased resort to negotiated quotas and voluntary restraint agreements as
a vehicle for resolving international trade disputes - most notably in the steel, textile and
automobile industries - this projected surge has failed to materialize. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 164-78.
19. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 251
(1982)). The Act also made conforming changes to the jurisdiction of the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, the predecessor court to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Pub. L. No. 96-417, §§ 401-404, 94 Stat. 1740-41 (1980).
20. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 19-20.
21. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 confers on the Court of International Trade "all the powers in
law and equity of . . .a district court of the United States."
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jurisdiction overlapped that of the Customs Court in international
trade matters. District court jurisdiction encompassed civil actions
involving revenue from imports on tonnage.22 It also included juris-
diction of any civil action on a bond executed under any law of the
United States.2 3 This jurisdictional grant to the district courts was
sufficiently broad to include actions seeking recovery on customs
bonds. In an effort to rectify this situation, Congress made it clear
that matters involving import transactions were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CIT24 by enacting sweeping revisions to existing
provisions governing the Customs Court's jurisdiction.25
Under the law which existed prior to the 1980 amendments, it
had "become increasingly more difficult to determine, in advance,
whether or not a particular case [fell] within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Customs Court . . . .The result [was] considerable juris-
dictional confusion .... ,,26 Some district courts had asserted juris-
diction over international trade actions,2 7 while others dismissed such
actions for lack of jurisdiction. 28 Whether or not the 1980 amend-
ments have achieved their intended purpose of eliminating this juris-
dictional confusion remains an open question. 29 Nevertheless, at a
minimum, it is fairly clear that in light of the CIT's new equitable
powers," international trade actions which seek injunctive relief
have not made their way into the district courts because of some
doubt as to the scope of the Court's equitable powers.
With this overview, we turn next to an examination of each of
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976). That jurisdictional grant continues today, subject to the
jurisdiction of the CIT over comparable matters. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1982).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1352 (1976). As with the district courts' jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1340, the district courts continue to possess jurisdiction over this class of cases, subject to the
jurisdiction of the CIT. 28 U.S.C. § 1352 (1982).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 30; S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3-4.
See Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1728-30 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1585
(1982)). See also infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1582 (1976), repealed by Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727.
26. S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 1-2.
27. See, e.g., Sneaker Circus v. Carter, 566 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1977); Timken Co. v.
Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28. See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States v. Committee for the Implementa-
tion of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984) (CIT declines ancillary jurisdiction over civil forfeiture action brought for viola-
tion of customs laws); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) (not all international trade disputes are within CIT's jurisdiction), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552
(1985); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F.
Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984) (district court had jurisdiction of action involving importation of
gray market goods under 19 U.S.C. § 1526); Dabul v. von Raab, No. 85-1 10-N (E.D. Va. filed
Feb. 6, 1985) (action seeking declaratory judgment of rights under 19 U.S.C. § 1592); Markey
& Sons, Inc. v. Brock, No. 84-4015-AHS(JRx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1984) (action seeking
mandatory relief under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 transferred to the CIT for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1982).
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the jurisdictional provisions enacted in 1980. As part of this exami-
nation, inquiry will be made as to whether each of those provisions
could be repealed in favor of a combination of administrative pro-
ceedings, direct appellate review of agency decisions to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC" or "Federal Circuit"), or
de novo proceedings in the district courts.
A. Section 1581
Section 1581,1 title 28, United States Code, is divided into ten
subsections.32 The first eight subsections reflect a discrete type of
civil action which may arise out of U.S. domestic international trade
laws and over which the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction. The ninth
subsection, section 1581(i),33 is a residual jurisdictional provision
designed to eliminate the confusion which existed regarding where
the jurisdiction of the district courts ended and that of the CIT be-
gan. 34 The tenth subsection, section 158 l(j),31 specifically forbids the
CIT from exercising jurisdiction over matters arising out of the im-
portation of immoral articles. 31
1. Sections 1581(a) and (b).-Section 1581(a) 37 grants the
Court exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action commenced to con-
test the denial of an administrative protest filed with the Customs
Service under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514 and 1515.8 The subject matters
encompassed by this subsection include the traditional tariff classifi-
cation and valuation cases, 9 as well as cases involving exclusion of
merchandise40 and claims for drawback,41 among other things. A
plaintiff who brings an action under this subsection is entitled to a
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-U). The statutory provisions governing procedure for each of
these civil actions are contained at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2631-2647 (1982).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
34. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 33. See generally Vance, The Unrealized
Jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i): A View from the Plaintiffs Bar, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
793 (1984); Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the Court of International Trade Under
the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 471 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Cohen I].
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(j) (1982).
36. See section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982).
That section includes within the heading "immoral articles" treasonous and obscene materials.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). That subjection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part,
under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. § 1515].
38. This subsection restated in substance the Court's prior authority as set forth in
former section 1582(a), title 28, United States Code. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2,
at 44.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(l)&(2) (1982). See generally R. STURM, CUSToMs LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION § 32.1 (1983).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(6). See 19 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982).
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trial de novo.4 2
Section 1581(b) 3 is a restatement of former section 1582(b),
title 28, United States Code. It empowers the CIT to hear any civil
action commenced by an American manufacturer pursuant to sec-
tion 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930."' In such an action, an American
manufacturer, producer or wholesaler may challenge de novo a clas-
sification or valuation decision by the Customs Service in connection
with importations of merchandise like that manufactured, produced
or sold by the American firm.4"
There is good reason to believe that holding an administrative
hearing before an administrative law judge in lieu of a trial before
the CIT, with direct appeal to the Federal Circuit from such an ad-
ministrative determination, would serve the ends of justice just as
well, if not better, than the existing system of judicial proceedings
established under section 1581(a) and (b). It is proposed, therefore,
that such an administrative review process be established within the
U.S. International Trade Commission, modelled in large part after
the system of adjudication and review which is presently in place
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.46 Several sound argu-
ments exist for implementing this proposal.
First, administrative law judges ("ALJ's") are fully capable of
handling the types of cases commonly arising under section 1581(a)
and (b). ALJ's are called upon to hear complex unfair trade practice
cases under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In section 337
cases an ALJ is required to make a determination whether certain
imports infringe upon United States patents, copyrights and trade-
marks,4 among other things. Those determinations are then referred
to the U.S. International Trade Commission for its approval or re-
42. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 44; 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b). That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. §
1516].
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982).
45. Id. See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 748 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). See Ablondi & McCarthy, Impact of the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission on Commercial Transactions, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 163, 174-76
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Ablondi & McCarthy]; Minchew & Webster, Regulating Unfair
Practices in International Trade: The Role of the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 27 (1978); Leonard & Foster, The Metamorphosis of the
U.S. International Trade Commission Under the Trade Act of 1974, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 719,
749-63 (1976); Note, Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade Practices Under Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 234 (1982). See also Kaye & Plaia,
The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section 337 Jurisdiction
of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 3 (1977).
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jection, 8 with direct appeal to the CAFC.49
If complex patent infringement decisions have been entrusted by
Congress for determination by an ALJ, it would seem that a fortiori
the same could be done with classification, valuation, drawback,
American manufacturer actions and related customs law matters.
There is certainly nothing so inherently difficult or complex about
this area of the tariff laws that an ALJ could not adequately and
fairly adjudicate the rights of litigants under these statutes. More
importantly, there are no vested rights at risk, nor are there any
other matters so sacrosanct in this field, that the services of an arti-
cle III judge are necessarily required, at least insofar as the adjudi-
catory phase of these proceedings are concerned.50
Second, as for one of the most frequently cited reasons for hav-
ing a national court such as the CIT - uniformity of decision in
matters involving customs duties51 - adjudication by ALJ's under
the Commission's direction would equally ensure that uniformity of
decision is preserved. Moreover, any aberrations in this respect could
be corrected by the Federal Circuit on appeal, or by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission when it reviews the decision of the ALJ.
Another reason advanced for having a special court such as the
CIT is the expertise which the judges of the Court supposedly bring
to bear upon trade and tariff issues.52 It is worth noting in this con-
nection, however, that of the last four judges appointed to the CIT
since 1983 (Judges Carman, Restani, DiCarlo and Aquilino), none
had any background or experience in the international trade field
before joining the Court. Whatever expertise the CIT does have in
this respect, it is safe to say that it has been acquired by and large
from experience gleaned from the bench and from the more senior
judges on the Court. It was not brought to the Court with the ap-
pointee. Clearly, expertise acquired from exposure to a field of law
can just as easily be acquired by an ALJ as it can by a federal
judge.
Finally, there are sound reasons for bringing this class of tariff
cases within the ambit of the International Trade Commission's ju-
risdiction. As an independent international trade agency, the Com-
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). Under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g), the President may disapprove a
Commission's recommended remedy within 60 days "for policy reasons." Of over 50 affirma-
tive determinations forwarded to the President, only four recommended remedies have been
disapproved. [Current Reports] 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 617 (May 1, 1985).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). See, e.g., Textron, Inc. v. ITC, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
50. In this connection, it is worth recalling that for 66 years an administrative tribunal
and article I judges adjudicated these cases. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
51. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 29; S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3.
52. S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3 ("The United States Court of International
Trade would continue to be equipped with the same expertise and specialized skills that the
United States Customs Court has acquired through the years.").
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mission would be an appropriate body for reviewing the various deci-
sions of the Customs Service in the classification, valuation and
drawback area. The Commission is well-equipped to review these
types of cases by virtue of the complex nature of the matters for
which it currently is responsible in the international trade field.53 In
addition, unlike the judicial adjudicatory process, statutory deadlines
can be imposed on the administrative adjudication process, 54 thereby
allaying fears that the determinations may not be expeditiously
reached.55 In fact, they may be reached more quickly.
In short, a strong case can be made for eliminating the CIT's
jurisdiction under section 1581(a) and (b), and for creating in lieu
thereof an administrative review process under the direction of the
International Trade Commission, with judicial review by the Federal
Circuit.
2. Section 1581 (c).-Of perhaps the greatest significance of all
the changes made by the Customs Courts Act is the enactment of
section 1581 (c). 56 This section vests in the CIT exclusive jurisdiction
to review administrative determinations made by the International
Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission") and the International
Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce ("ITA") in
the context of the antidumping duty and countervailing duty stat-
utes. The Trade Agreements Act of 197957 made wholesale revisions
to those laws, superseding in large measure the Tariff Act of 1930
and the Antidumping Act of 1921.58
53. In addition to section 337 cases, the Commission is responsible for making injury
determinations under the antidumping duty ("AD") and countervailing duty ("CVD") stat-
utes, and import and injury determinations under the escape clause. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671,
1673, & 2251 (1982), respectively. See generally Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and
the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and Its Interpretation by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 52 IND. L.J. 535 (1977); Kennedy, Causation Under the Escape
Clause: The Case For Retaining the "Substantial Cause" Standard, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 185
(1985).
54. Statutory deadlines for reaching determinations have been imposed on both the
International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce in several international
trade statutes. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1671b(a)&(b), 1673b(a)&(b), and 2251(d)(2); Ablondi
& McCarthy, supra note 47, at 181-83. See also infra note 77.
55. See S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3-4 ("This [clarification of the Court's
jurisdiction] would enable the Customs Court to render extremely expeditious decisions in
matters which are important both to our country and to our trading partners.").
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a].
See Amerine, Jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade: One Year After the Customs
Courts Act of 1980, 29 FED. B. NEws & J. 43 (1982); Cohen, The Trade Agreements Act of
1979: Executive Agreements, Subsidies, and Countervailing Duties, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 96
(1980); Note, Judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
Towards a Unified System of Review, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 101 (1979).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-30, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106, 93 Stat. 193 (1979).
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In brief, section 1581(c), in conjunction with section 516A of
the Tariff Act of 1930,59 empowers the CIT to review certain deter-
minations made by the Commission and the ITA in the course of
antidumping duty ("AD") and countervailing duty ("CVD") investi-
gations.6 0 Those determinations which are judicially reviewable in-
clude the following:
1. A determination by the ITA not to initiate an
investigation; 6'
2. A determination by the ITC not to review a determina-
tion under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) based upon changed
circumstances; 6
3. A preliminary determination of no injury by the ITC; 3
4. A final determination, either affirmative or negative, by
the ITC or ITA under the AD or CVD law;6"
5. A determination by the ITA to suspend an AD or CVD
investigation; 5
6. An injurious effect determination by the ITC under 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h) or 1673c(h);66 and
7. A determination by the ITA whether a particular type of
merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described
in an AD or CVD order.6 7
In essence, review by the CIT of these various administrative
determinations differs little from appellate review of agency deci-
sions currently conducted by the federal courts of appeals in cases
concerning decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, 8 the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 9 the Interstate Commerce Com-
See generally Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before
and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076 (1981).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-573, § 623, 98 Stat. 2948, 3040.
60. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1677 (1982). See generally Barshefsky & Cunning-
ham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Barshefsky & Cunningham];
deKieffer, When, Why, and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceeding: A Complainant's
Perspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 363 (1981); Hemmendinger & Barringer, The
Defense of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 427 (1981); Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping
and Countervailing Duties Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 14 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1979); Note, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Countervailing and
Antidumping Duty Procedures, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 63 (1979).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1)(A), as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 623, 98 Stat. 2948, 3040.
62. Id. § 1516a(a)(1)(B).
63. Id. § 1516a(a)(1)(C).
64. Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i), (ii) & (iii).
65. Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv).
66. Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(v).
67. Id. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1982).
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mission, 0 the Federal Communications Commission,7 1 or the Merit
Systems Protection Board. 72 In section 1581(c) cases, CIT review is
upon the administrative record,73 with the standard of review gener-
ally being whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.7 4
While this two-tiered appellate review of agency action by the
CIT and the CAFC as created under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a is not
unique in the field of administrative law 7 5 it is doubtful that these
two levels of judicial review are essential in the context of AD and
CVD determinations by the ITA and the Commission.
First, considering the substantial litigation expense resulting
from an additional appeal,76 not to mention the attendant delay 7 7 it
is open to serious question whether the benefits, if any, of increased
judicial scrutiny justify the increased costs and delays. The type of
record sifting which may have to be done by a reviewing court in
international trade cases is certainly no more complex or difficult
than the type of record review which the courts of appeals face daily
in reviewing voluminous agency records compiled by the National
Labor Relations Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for
example. The Federal Circuit itself regularly conducts such record
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1982).
71. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2342(2) (1982).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (1982).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b).
74. Id. See generally Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v.
United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984); American Spring Wire Corp. v. United
States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1280-81 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). In certain preliminary determina-
tions, such as a decision by the ITA not to initiate an investigation, the standard of review is
whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A). See Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United
States, 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). An appeal as a matter of right may be taken
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the CIT's decisions. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(5).
75. See, e.g., Danks v. Fields, 696 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1982) (concerning review of
decisions made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 560
F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass), afld sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983)
(National Environmental Policy Act); Woods v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Tenn.),
affid, 508 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1974) (Social Security Administration).
76. See Barshefsky, & Cunningham, supra note 60, at 313-14 ("Dumping cases are
among the most expensive proceedings in the U.S. trade law arsenal. The cost to the petitioner
of an antidumping investigation in even the simplest case will run into six figures."). See also
infra note 80.
77. One of the chief purposes for enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was
to shorten the length of AD and CVD proceedings. See S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
58, 75 (1979). As noted in that report, "a major objective of this revision of the countervailing
duty law is to reduce the length of an investigation . . . . The committee intends the usual
investigation under the new law to be no more than 205 calendar days." Id. at 58. Similar
sentiments are expressed at page 75 of that report in connection with antidumping duty inves-
tigations. See also S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3-4 (Customs Courts Act designed to
ensure more expeditious decisions).
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reviews in section 337 and Merit Systems Protection Board appeals.
In reviewing the AD and CVD decisions of the CIT, moreover,
the CAFC undertakes its own independent examination of the
agency record,78 thereby duplicating the effort of the CIT in these
cases. If expeditious and economical disposition of these cases is the
desiderata, it is questionable whether two-tiered appel!ate review as
a matter of right is the appropriate means to this end.
In 1983 a bill was introduced in the Senate to eliminate the
CIT's jurisdiction under section 1581(c).79 Among the purposes for
the bill was the reduction of litigation expense and delays connected
with AD and CVD appeals. 80 The Senate bill was deleted from the
final version of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.81
One of the greatest inroads on the CIT's jurisdiction could be in
the area of AD and CVD appeals. As the foregoing discussion has
shown, sound reasons exist for eliminating the Court's jurisdiction
over these two types of cases.
3. Section 1581(d).-Section 1581(d)82 gives the CIT exclu-
78. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 932 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("resolution of whether the [CIT] correctly held that the Commission's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence requires [the CAFC's] consideration of the evidence
presented to and the analysis by the Commission."); Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744
F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
79. S. 1672, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S10,755-57 (1983).
80. As noted in the fact sheet accompanying the bill:
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Under current law, the U.S. Court of International Trade is the court for
review of AD/CVD cases. The bill would assign this responsibility to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
AD/CVD cases are currently subject to a two-step appeals process, in
which determinations are first appealed to the Court of International Trade and
then to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The only function of the
courts in these cases is to conduct an appellate review of the agency proceedings.
Such review is more appropriate for a court of appeals than for a trial court. By
eliminating the first step in this process, the bill brings the import relief area into
conformity with the usual administrative practice and reduces the costs associ-
ated with appellate review by two different courts.
129 CONG. REC. SI0,757 (1983).
81. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984). As reported in the conference committee
report to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984:
Senate bill
Eliminating the U.S. Court of International trade [sic] from judicial review
of [AD and CVD] determinations so all appeals go directly to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit; makes conforming changes in section
2639(a)(I) and 2647 of 28 U.S.C.
Conference agreement
The Conferees agreed to strike the Senate provision.
H.R. Rep. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1984).
82. 28 U.S.C.,§ 1581(d). This subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to review -
(1) any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section
223 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of workers for
adjustment assistance under such Act;
(2) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under sec-
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sive jurisdiction of trade adjustment assistance cases which are ap-
pealed to it from the determinations of the Secretaries of Labor and
Commerce. Under the Trade Act of 1974,83 financial assistance is
available to workers, 8' businesses, 85 and communities 86 which have
suffered economic distress due to foreign imports. Receipt of benefits
is conditioned upon a certification of eligibility made by the Secre-
tary of Labor in the case of workers, 87 and by the Secretary of Com-
merce in the case of firms and communities. 88
Prior to enactment of the Customs Courts Act, jurisdiction over
appeals from trade adjustment determinations of the Secretary of
Labor refusing to certify workers as eligible for adjustment assis-
tance was entrusted exclusively to the regional courts of appeals.89
There was no right to appeal a negative determination of the Secre-
tary of Commerce before 1980.90
The explanation for expanding the CIT's jurisdiction to include
all trade adjustment assistance cases was a simple one and singular:
to give persons adversely affected by agency action arising out of
import transactions the same access to judicial review as had been
made available in other provisions of the Customs Courts Act to
similarly aggrieved persons."1 Consequently, if rights to judicial re-
view by the CIT granted by those other provisions of the Act were to
be eliminated, then ipso facto the rationale for having CIT review of
trade adjustment assistance cases would vanish.
Again, many of the same arguments made in connection with
eliminating the CIT's jurisdiction under section 1581(c) are equally
applicable to section 1581(d), 92 i.e., elimination of delay and reduc-
tion of litigation expense. These two goals are especially important in
the case of trade adjustment assistance decisions in which individu-
als, firms and communities may very well be in dire economic
straights and in immediate need of assistance. Strong reasons thus
exist for restoring the status quo ante with regard to the certification
tion 251 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a firm
for adjustment assistance under such Act; and
(3) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under sec-
tion 271 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of a
community for adjustment assistance under such Act.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 45.
83. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487
(1976)).
84. 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (1982).
85. Id. § 2344.
86. Id. § 2373.
87. Id. § 2273.
88. Id. §§ 2341, 2371.
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2322 (1976) (repealed 1980).
90. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341 & 2371 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 45.
91. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 45.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
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appeal process, with two refinements. Jurisdiction over all such ap-
peals should be exclusively in the CAFC in order to maintain uni-
formity in the decisional process. In addition, Commerce Depart-
ment certification determinations should be subject to the same type
of appellate judicial review as was the case with Labor Department
certification decisions, with appeals from both Departments being
taken to the CAFC directly.
4. Section 1581(e).-Section 1581(e)93 confers upon the CIT
exclusive jurisdiction to review all final determinations of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979.1" This latter section provides that the Secretary
of the Treasury is to determine whether certain articles are the prod-
uct of a foreign country and, if so, which foreign country for pur-
poses of title III of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.1" That title
implements the government procurement code.9" The decisions of the
Secretary of the Treasury are reviewed de novo by the CIT.9 7 To
date, there have been no reported decisions under section 1581(e).
Given the paucity of case law under section 1581(e), it is some-
what problematic to suggest an alternative forum or method of dis-
pute resolution of cases which might arise under this section. It
would seem, however, that some form of administrative adjudication
process comparable to that suggested in connection with section
1581(d) 9 would be feasible. Alternatively, jurisdiction of section
1581(e) cases could be transferred to the district courts if the need
to preserve de novo judicial review is deemed imperative. If the latter
alternative is adopted, the risk of inconsistent decisions arising out of
this area would appear to be slight, considering that no occasions for
judicial review under section 1581(e) have ever arisen. Finally, since
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(e). That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to review any final determination of the Secretary of the
Treasury under section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 [19
U.S.C. § 2515(b)(1)].
94. 19 U.S.C. § 2515(b)(1) (1985). That section provides:
RULES OF ORIGIN
(I) ADVISORY RULINGS AND FINAL DETERMINA-
TIONS.-For the purposes of this title, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall provide for the prompt issuance of advisory rulings and final deter-
minations on whether, under section 2518(4)(B), an article is or would be
a product of a foreign country or instrumentality designated pursuant to
section 2511 (b).
See S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 132-33 (1979) ("Section 301(b) [19 U.S.C. §
2511 (b)] specifies for circumstances in which the President may designate a foreign country as
eligible for a waiver from U.S. statutes which establish a preference for domestic suppliers.").
95. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518 (1982). '
96. See S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 254-56 (1979).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(3).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79 and 82-92.
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section 1581(e) jurisdiction has never been invoked, the district
courts would not be saddled with an onerous burden if section
1581(e) jurisdiction were transferred to them.
5. Section 1581 (f.-Section 1581(f) 9 clarified certain provi-
sions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 relating to judicial appli-
cations for access to confidential information pursuant to section
777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930.100 Under Section 1581(f), the
CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over actions challenging agency refus-
als to disclose confidential information received by the ITA or the
Commission during the course of an AD or CVD investigation. 101
It is proposed that jurisdiction over these cases be transferred to
the district courts. As is true with section 1581(e) cases, the number
of cases arising under section 1581(f) has been extremely few. 10 2
This kind of case is also one which the district courts are well-suited
to decide. Not only do the district courts have responsibility for re-
viewing all administrative subpoena enforcement matters arising in
connection with investigations conducted by the Customs Service, 03
but they handle motions to compel discovery on a regular basis.'"
The district courts are thus not strangers to this type of legal issue.
Moreover, the three-pronged test employed by the CIT in determin-
ing generally whether to release confidential information obtained by
an agency in the course of its investigation - (1) the government's
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(0. That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action involving an application for an order directing the administering au-
thority [the Department of Commerce] or the International Trade Commission
to make confidential information available under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff
Act of 1930.
100. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(2) (1982). That section provides in part:
Disclosure under court order -
If the administering authority [the Department of Commerce] denies a re-
quest for information under paragraph (I) [19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c)(1)], or the
[International Trade] Commission denies a request for confidential information
submitted by the petitioner or an interested party . . then application may be
made to the United States [Court of International Trade] for an order directing
the administering authority or the Commission to make the information availa-
ble ....
See generally Garfinkel, Disclosure of Confidential Documents Under the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979: A Corporate Nightmare? 13 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 465 (1981).
101. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 46. See Monsanto Industrial Chemical Co. v.
United States, No. 83-117 slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 10, 1983); In re U.S. International
Trade Commission Investigation No. AA1921-147A, 491 F. Supp. 1356 (Cust. Ct. 1980). See
generally American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1538 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983), and cases cited therein for a discussion of release of confidential information when AD
and CVD determinations are pending judicial review.
102. Only three decisions arising under section 1581(f) have been reported to date. See
cases cited infra note 169.
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1509-1510 (1982).
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Such discovery questions include whether business confiden-
tial materials are to be released. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2403 (1970).
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need to obtain confidential information in future cases, (2) the need
of litigants for data used by the government, and (3) the need of
foreign manufacturers to protect sensitive business information10 5 _
is not so unique or complex a test that the district courts would en-
counter difficulties in adequately disposing of applications for release
of confidential information.
6. Section 1581(g).--Section 1581(g)106 grants the Court ex-
clusive jurisdiction to review any decision of the Secretary of the
Treasury denying or revoking a customhouse broker's license under
section 641(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,107 or revoking or sus-
pending a customhouse broker's license under section 641(b) of the
Tariff Act of 1930.108 Prior to enactment of the Customs Courts Act,
judicial review of these matters was committed to the courts of
appeals. 109
Congress' rationale for giving the CIT jurisdiction over these
cases was the same as that given in connection with section 1581(d)
jurisdiction: uniformity of jurisdiction of civil actions involving tariff
and international trade statutes.110
Present law maintains the prior statutory provision of affording
customhouse brokers whose license is revoked or suspended with an
administrative hearing at which testimony is taken.1 The broker
may be represented by counsel, 2 and witnesses may be cross-ex-
amined.1 13 The substantial evidence standard of review is applica-
ble. 14 There are no comparable administrative hearing rights con-
ferred upon applicants whose customhouse broker's license
application is denied.' 1 5 However, an aggrieved applicant is entitled
105. See S. Rep. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1979) (the CIT is to determine
.'whether the need of the party requesting the information outweighs the need of the party
submitting the information for continued confidential treatment."); American Spring Wire
Corp. v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1538, 1539-40 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g). That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to review -
(I) any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny or revoke a
customs broker's license under section 641(b)(2) or (3) or (c) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 or to deny a customs broker's permit under section
641(c)(1) of such Act, or to revoke a license or permit under section
641(b)(5) or (c)(2) of such Act; and (2) any decision of the Secretary of
the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customhouse broker's license under
section 641(d)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1982). See Nikolic v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1042 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983).
108. 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (1982).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (1976) (repealed 1980).
110. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 46.
III. 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Customs Service regulations provide for notice of a denial of a license application
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to a trial de novo before the CIT." '
Considering that the only explanation given by Congress for ex-
panding the CIT's jurisdiction in this area was that of uniformity, " 7
there would certainly be little continuing justification for not turning
review of license revocations under section 641(b) over to the Fed-
eral Circuit if the CIT's jurisdiction is abrogated under the other
jurisdictional provisions of section 1581. In the case of license appli-
cants whose application is denied, additional due process guarantees
should be implemented at the administrative level. These should in-
clude some form of hearing,118 inasmuch as an unsuccessful appli-
cant's right to a trial de novo would be eliminated. Direct appeal to
the CAFC could then be taken after the hearing, with the scope of
review being the substantial evidence standard.
7. Section 1581(h).-Section 1581(h) " 9 confers exclusive ju-
risdiction upon the CIT to entertain actions challenging rulings of
the Secretary of the Treasury issued prior to the importation of
goods regarding such questions as the tariff classification, valuation
or rate of duty of those goods.120 Persons seeking judicial review
must demonstrate that they would be irreparably harmed unless
given an opportunity to obtain judicial review of the Secretary's de-
cision prior to importation of the merchandise. 21
Due to the requirement that an aggrieved person must make
this showing of irreparable harm in order to obtain review under sec-
tion 1581(h), 22 this new grant of subject matter jurisdiction has
together with reasons therefor. 19 C.F.R. §§ 111.11-.19 (1984).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(5).
117. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
118. By regulation, an unsuccessful applicant can seek review of a license denial with
the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of the Treasury. 19 C.F.R. § 111.17. How-
ever, that regulation does not provide any standards for denying such a request, apparently
leaving it to the discretion of the Commissioner and Secretary whether or not to grant further
review. Id.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h). That subsection provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods involved,
a ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change
such a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, re-
stricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar
matters, but only if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the
court that he would be irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain
judicial review prior to such importation.
120. See Bally/Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Regan, 565 F. Supp. 1045 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 46. See generally Cohen, Recent Decisions
of the Court of International Trade Relating to Jurisdiction: A Primer and A Critique, 58 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 700, 743-46 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Cohen il].
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h). See American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States,
718 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1909 (1984); 718 Fifth Avenue
Corp. v. United States, No. 83-39 slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 13, 1984); Manufacture de
Machines du Haut-Rhin v. von Raab, 569 F. Supp. 877 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
122. See Manufacture de Machines du Haut-Rhin v. von Raab, 569 F. Supp. 877, 882
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been rarely used.12 3 It has, in fact, proven thus far to be a damp
squib. 2 "
It is proposed that in lieu of review by the CIT, the CAFC be
given jurisdiction over section 1581 (h) cases directly from an admin-
istrative proceeding at which the person seeking a ruling may pre-
sent evidence and argumentation in support of his or her position. 1 2
Absent an agency decision supported by substantial evidence on the
record, any such decision would not be sustained on appeal."2 '
8. Section 1581(i).-Section 1581 (i),1 27 the CIT's grant of
residual jurisdictional power,12 8 confers subject matter jurisdiction
upon the Court over international trade and tariff actions which
arise out of certain tariff and revenue cases, embargoes, and the ad-
ministration of matters referred to in section 1581(a)-(h). 2 9 The
purpose of this broad jurisdictional grant over a variety of interna-
tional trade issues was to eliminate the confusion that existed as to
the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the district courts and
the Customs Court in these matters.130
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) ("There has been no showing that Manurhin does not have the ability
to import a test shipment of pistols and file a protest against any adverse decision by Cus-
toms."); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 46-47. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2640(d).
123. See cases cited supra note 121; Pagoda Trading Co. v. United States, 577 F. Supp.
22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). See generally Cohen II, supra note 120, at 743-46, and cases cited
therein.
124. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 47 ("It is not the Committee's intent to
permit judicial review prior to the completion of the import transaction in such a manner as to
negate the traditional method of obtaining judicial review of import transactions.").
125. See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
126. Id.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). This subsection provides:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International
Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth
in subsection () of this section, the Court of International Trade shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing
for -
(I) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchan-
dise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or
safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters re-
ferred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h)
of this section.
128. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 47; United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d
467 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
129. Id. See Cohen I, supra note 120, at 746; Cohen I, supra note 34, passim.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 47. As that report noted:
This provision makes it clear that all suits of the type specified are properly
commenced only in the Court of International Trade. The Committee has in-
cluded this provision in the legislation to eliminate much of the difficulty exper-
ienced by international trade litigants who in the past commenced suits in the
district courts only to have those suits dismissed for want of subject matter juris-
diction. The grant of jurisdiction in subsection (i) will ensure that these suits will
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If section 1581(i) were repealed along with the rest of section
1581, provisions within title 28 which confer jurisdiction upon the
district courts in certain customs matters would adequately fill the
gap. First, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdictional stat-
ute, in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act,131 would
generally empower the district courts to entertain actions brought
under trade and tariff laws. 13 2 Second, and more specifically, the
provision conferring jurisdiction on the district courts in cases involv-
ing customs duties,133 if expanded to include cases involving actions
concerning tariffs and duties on imports for non-revenue purposes
and cases concerning embargoes, would account for a large percent-
age of the balance of cases coming within the CIT's section 1581(i)
jurisdiction. 13
The potential burden on the district courts of assuming jurisdic-
tion over this category of cases is discussed in Part III below.
B. Section 1582
While section 1581(a)-(i) provides for jurisdiction over suits
against the United States, section 1582135 empowers the CIT to hear
actions commenced by the United States in three subject areas: (1)
suits to recover certain civil penalties, 136 (2) suits to recover upon a
bond relating to imports, 137 and (3) suits to recover customs
duties.1 38
Regarding the three types of civil penalty actions specified in
section 1582(1), prior to 1980 the district courts had exclusive juris-
diction13 9 over civil penalty actions brought under section 592 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.140 This arrangement was reaffirmed with the en-
be heard on their merits.
Id. But see supra note 29.
131. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) has been analogized to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Cohen I, supra
note 34, at 497-98.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1340.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1) & (2).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1985). That section provides:
The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any
civil action which arises out of an import transaction and which is commenced
by the United States -
(I) to recover a civil penalty under section 592, 641(a)(1)(C),
641(d)(2)(A), or-734(i)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930;
(2) to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchan-
dise required by the laws of the United States or by the Secretary of the
Treasury; or
(3) to recover customs duties.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(1). See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 48-49.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(3).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1976) (repealed 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1976).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1592.
[Vol. 4:1
A PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH THE CIT
actment in 1978 of the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplifica-
tion Act,' 41 with jurisdiction of all section 592 penalty actions being
maintained in the district courts.'4 The Customs Courts Act eventu-
ally transferred jurisdiction over section 592 actions to the CIT.141
In addition to conferring jurisdiction over section 592 penalty
actions, the Act also enlarged the Court's jurisdiction to entertain
penalty actions brought by the United States for breach of a CVD144
or AD 45 suspension agreement." 4
Several good reasons exist for returning section 592 jurisdiction
to the district courts, and to include as part of that jurisdiction the
power to hear penalty actions under the CVD and AD statutes as
well. First, there is nothing particularly unique about these cases be-
sides the fact that they arise out of violations of the tariff and inter-
national trade laws of the United States. The elements of these pen-
alty actions are essentially no different from other types of fraud
actions presently tried in the district courts under related tariff
laws."47 Second, the Court and the parties are often put to great in-
convenience because of the CIT's location in New York City."48 Sec-
tion 592 penalty actions arise all over the United States, at any port
of entry. Although the CIT is a court of national jurisdiction" 9 and
is thus empowered to try cases throughout the United States, 50 the
problem is not one of power but rather one of logistics. This is espe-
cially true in instances of status conferences, discovery motions, and
other pre-trial matters. Frequently, oral argument is waived because
of the great distances involved. A good deal of the Court's business
is thus necessarily conducted by telephone, particularly when counsel
are located outside of the New York City area. While this arrange-
141. Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 893 (1978).
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) (Supp. IV 1980) (repealed 1980).
143. Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 609, 94 Stat. 1746 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) and 28
U.S.C. § 1582(l) (1982)).
144. Section 704(i)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(i)(2) (1982).
145. Section 734(i)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1763c(i)(2) (1982). The elements of a penalty action under sections
704(i)(2) and 734(i)(2) are based on the identical elements of a section 592 penalty action.
146. See Holmer & Bellow, U.S. Import Law and Policy Series: Suspension and Settle-
ment Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 INT'L LAW. 683 (1984).
A suspension agreement is an agreement between the United States and a foreign govern-
ment or foreign manufacturer wherein the United States agrees to suspend an AD or CVD
investigation in exchange for the foreign government's commitment to completely eliminate all
subsidies, 19 U.S.C. § 167 1c(b); or a foreign manufacturer's commitment to cease dumping or
importing altogether, 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b).
147. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 542 (entry of goods by means of false statements); 18 U.S.C.
§ 545 (smuggling goods into the United States); and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements to an
officer of the United States). See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S.
232 (1972).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 251(c).
149. S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 256(a) (1982).
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ment may be economical in some respects, case supervision via tele-
phone is a poor second best. A certain sharp edge in the litigation
process is lost. In addition, probably owing in some measure to the
CIT's location in New York City, East coast law firms have tended
to dominate the international trade and tariff market.
Because of the infrequency of face-to-face meetings, the judges
of the CIT are not as familiar with counsel. This would be otherwise
if section 592 penalty actions were managed from the district where
counsel for the parties are located. Supervising a case by long-dis-
tance telephone calls is hardly the most desirable method for han-
dling a court's docket on a regular basis. The benefit of face-to-face
encounters, although an intangible one, cannot be minimized. Judges
can get a "feel" for the attorneys in a case through such meetings.
This can be especially helpful when the possibilities of settlement
need to be explored.
In addition, based on the author's own experience at the CIT as
a law clerk and as a trial attorney for the Justice Department, dis-
agreements often arise over where the Court should hold a trial in
penalty actions. The parties jockey for position in the hope of captur-
ing some perceived benefit in having the trial at a particular site. If
the district courts had jurisdiction over these cases, by contrast, the
well-defined statutory provisions on venue"' and the well-developed
body of case law 52 under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
would resolve problems in this regard with a minimum of contention.
Another difficulty in having penalty actions tried by the CIT is
that of jury trials. A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in a section
592 action. 153 A problem arises, however, with jury selection by the
CIT, a court which has conducted only one jury trial in its history.
While not an insurmountable problem,1 54 it is one more factor ad-
ding friction to an otherwise slow and frequently protracted process.
Finally, the genuine possibility exists that defendants who are
sued under section 592 in the CIT will have to defend against two
actions simultaneously in two different federal forums based on the
same set of operative facts.'5 5 The United States has filed section
592 penalty actions with the CIT seeking not only a penalty under
151. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1392, 1395 & 1402 (1982).
152. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404; 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1352 (1969).
153. See H.R. Rep. No. 1235, supra note 2, at 34; 28 U.S.C. § 1876 (1982).
154. With assistance from the clerks of the various district courts the CIT could proba-
bly conduct a jury trial with some level of efficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1876.
155. The CIT has declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a pendent civil forfei-
ture claim under 18 U.S.C. § 545 in two cases where the United States was seeking to recover
civil penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592. United States v. Tabor, 608 F. Supp. 658 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985); United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
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that section, but also a forfeiture under related federal laws.156 How-
ever, in the only two decisions reported to date on this issue, 5 7 the
CIT declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the related civil
forfeiture claim. 58 In one of those cases, United States v. Gold
Mountain Coffee, Ltd.,"5 9 the United States filed a separate forfei-
ture action in district court' 6 following dismissal by the CIT of the
forfeiture claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defen-
dants were thus exposed to the expense of defending against two sep-
arate actions arising out of the same set of facts in federal forums
3,000 miles apart. Clearly, if the district courts had jurisdiction over
section 592 penalty actions, this untenable situation for defendants
would not arise.' 6'
As for the two collection actions which the United States may
commence under the customs laws and over which the CIT has juris-
diction under section 1582(2) and (3),162 statutory provisions cur-
rently exist conferring jurisdiction upon the district courts in such
cases, except in cases in which the CIT has jurisdiction."" Amend-
ing those provisions by deleting references to the CIT and repealing
section 1582 would place jurisdiction over these actions squarely in
the district courts.
III. The Potential Burden on the Judicial System
The foregoing proposals will unquestionably mean more work
for the district courts if adopted. What is that burden and can the
district courts absorb the additional caseload? 64 One of the primary
reasons for enactment of the Customs Courts Act was to relieve
some of the pressure on the burgeoning dockets of the district
courts. 6 5 An examination of the reported decision of the CIT, how-
156. See cases cited supra note 155.
157. See cases cited supra note 155.
158. See cases cited supra note 155.
159. 597 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
160. United States v. 34,108 Bags of Robusta Green Coffee Beans, No. C84-6878 AJZ
(N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 22, 1984).
161. Regarding the civil penalty actions under sections 704(i)(2) and 734(i)(2), the dis-
trict courts presently possess jurisdiction of any action for the recovery of "any fine, penalty or
forfeiture." 28 U.S.C. § 1355. By eliminating the CIT's jurisdiction over such penalty actions,
the district courts would automatically assume jurisdiction over them.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) & (3).
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 (customs duties) and 1352 (bonds). See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (con-
ferring jurisdiction upon the district courts of all civil actions commenced by the United
States).
164. The proposals made in this article, if adopted, would not create any additional work
for the CAFC per se.
165. S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3. As noted in that report:
Recently, the district courts have become overburdened and overworked
through the years leading to considerable delays in the resolution of disputes.
The comparatively recent increase in litigation in the field of international trade
has compounded this problem by overtaxing the already outstanding caseload of
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ever, indicates that the additional caseload on the district courts
would be insubstantial.
Under the proposals suggested in this article, the district courts
would assume jurisdiction over section 1581(i) "residual jurisdic-
tion" cases,' ee over section 1581(f) cases involving access to confi-
dential information, 67  and over all actions commenced by the
United States under section 1582.168 Through 1984 there were only
three published CIT decisions involving a section 1581(f) action
seeking access to confidential information."' As for the section 1582
cases, from November 1, 1980 through December 31, 1984, there
were twenty-two reported CIT decisions involving section 1582 juris-
diction.170 That figure does not account for court time spent on pre-
trial conferences and related matters, of course. Still, for a period of
time spanning more than four years, twenty-two published opinions
is hardly a daunting figure, especially if those cases were spread na-
tionwide among all of the district courts. Under these circumstances,
the impact of the additional cases on the district courts would be
minimal.
It is somewhat more problematic to determine what the addi-
tional burden on the district courts would be in connection with sec-
tion 1581(i) cases. Many of the issues that have arisen in section
1581(i) cases that have been the subject of published opinions have
involved questions of jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies.17 1 Several decisions of the CIT have, however, reached the
merits of the cases.' 7 2
While it is difficult to accurately determine to what extent the
CIT's workload is attributable to section 1581(i) cases,' 7 3 one objec-
the district courts. Conversely, the volume of litigation instituted in the Customs
Court has decreased. Under these circumstances, the Committee believes that it
makes good sense to require that some of the cases now instituted in the over-
crowded district courts clearly belong in the under-utilized Customs Court.
Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 127-34.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 135-63.
169. Monsanto Industrial Chemical Co. v. United States, No. 83-117 slip op. (Nov. 10,
1983); Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1982); In re U.S. International Trade Commission Investigation No. AA1921-
147A, 491 F. Supp. 1356 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
170. In some instances, a single action was the source of more than one published opin-
ion. See, e.g., United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 510, 601 F. Supp.
212, 601 F. Supp. 215 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
171. See, e.g., American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546
(Fed. Cir. 1983); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1982); U.S. Cane
Sugar Refiners' Association v. Block, 638 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
172. See, e.g., American Association of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751
F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Mast Industries, Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984), appeal dismissed, No. 85-835 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 1985).
173. In 1981, there were 14 CIT slip opinions in which the Court's section 1581(i) juris-
diction was either cited as a basis for jurisdiction or was an issue in the case. In 1982, there
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tive measure is the total number of published opinions the CIT
promulgates annually. By this measure, not only is the CIT far from
overworked, but the district courts could probably assume jurisdic-
tion over all actions now brought in the CIT without any appreciable
difficulty. Indeed, based on the work production of the CIT, one
.could well wonder why the CIT was not abolished long ago.174
Although the number of judges on the CIT has fluctuated some-
what over the past five years due to death and judges taking senior
status, the average number of judges actively participating in the
Court's work has been nine from 1981 through 1984. The number of
slip opinions published by the CIT for each of those four years has
been fairly constant, as shown in the following table:
Year Number of Slip Opinions
1981 124
1982 123
1983 140
1984 141
Dividing the number of judges (nine) by the number of pub-
lished opinions yields an annual figure of slip opinions per judge of
14 for 1981-82, and 16 for 1983-84. That is less than two slip opin-
ions per month per judge. By comparison, in 1984 the district court
judges of the First Circuit had nearly 450 opinions published in Fed-
eral Supplement and Federal Rules Decisions. There are twenty-two
judges on active status and six who are on senior status. Assuming
that the six senior judges were active on a full-time basis, as an aver-
age figure each of those twenty-eight judges wrote approximately
sixteen opinions in 1984. That figure equals the number of slip opin-
ions published by each of the judges of the CIT in 1983 and 1984. It
must be remembered, however, that frequently memorandum opin-
ions and findings of fact and conclusions of law issued by the district
courts are not published. Without exception, comparable opinions by
the CIT are published as slip opinions and eventually printed in the
official of the Court. In addition, extremely short slip opinions of
three pages or less are published by the CIT."7 5 These statistics then,
although reflecting a comparable work effort by the CIT and the
district court judges of the First Circuit in terms of published opin-
ions, are clearly skewed in favor of the CIT. 7 '
were nine such opinions; in 1983, eleven; and in 1984, nine.
174. The Senate noted in 1979 that "the volume of litigation in the Customs Court has
decreased." S. Rep. No. 466, supra note 18, at 3. That report described the Customs Court as
"under-utilized." Id.
175. Of the 65 slip opinions published in volume 5 of U.S. Court of International Trade
Reports, for example, 31 opinions were three pages or less in length.
176. Another comparison can be made with the number of published opinions promul-
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Moreover, with few exceptions nearly all of the district court's
docket is composed of de novo proceedings. A large percentage of a
district court judge's working time is thus spent on the bench em-
panelling juries, hearing trials, and preparing findings of fact and
conclusions of law in bench trials. By marked contrast, the CIT
functions more like an appellate court.177 Only a small fraction of
the CIT's work involves de novo proceedings, 78 meaning that the
CIT judges spend far less time on the bench than do their district
court brothers and sisters. Given this consideration, the number of
published opinions issued by the district court judges of the First
Circuit is impressive.
In short, considering the total workload of the CIT as measured
by its published opinions issued over the past four years, the burden
on the district courts would be negligible if the CIT's jurisdiction
under sections 1581(f), 1581(i) and 1582 were transferred to the dis-
trict courts.
IV. Conclusion
The preceding discussion has shown that through a combination
of: (1) shifting classification and valuation cases to administrative
law judges; (2) having direct appellate review by the Federal Circuit
of antidumping and countervailing duty appeals, trade adjustment
assistance appeals, and customhouse broker license determinations;
and (3) giving the district courts jurisdiction of certain penalty and
duty collection actions, the continuing need for the Court of Interna-
tional Trade would no longer exist. Not only would the costs of liti-
gating international trade cases be reduced by eliminating duplica-
tive appeals in AD and CVD cases, but overall uniformity of
decisions would be preserved in the remaining areas by having appel-
late review of all trade and tariff matters in the CAFC. Cost savings
would be realized by litigants by eliminating two-step appeals in four
categories of cases' 79 and by reducing travel and related expenses to
New York City by counsel who live in distant locations. Not only
gated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1984. That court published nearly 300
opinions in 1984, representing an average of 50 opinions per circuit judge for that year, or
three times the number of opinions published by the CIT in 1984. While this figure does not
take into account the contributions of visiting judges who sat by designation on the First Cir-
cuit in 1984, that figure also does not include the innumerable summary dispositions by that
court.
177. Only one jury trial to date has been held in the CIT. See 28 U.S.C. § 1876 (permit-
ting trials by jury in the CIT). The overwhelming number of CIT slip opinions involve motion
practice, e.g., motions for summary judgment, to dismiss, to compel discovery, and for review
upon the administrative record. In 1983 the CIT conducted 19 trials. In 1984, there were only
14 CIT trials de novo.
178. Id.
179. Those cases are AD, CVD, trade adjustment assistance and customhouse broker's
license appeals.
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would the burden on the district courts be minimal if the CIT were
abolished, but the administration of justice would be improved.

